

Virginia's Public-Private Partnership Approach

Barbara W. Reese, Summer/Fall 2006



- Commonwealth responsible for maintaining the third largest highway system in country – more than 70,000 miles
- Last sustainable state revenue increase for transportation in 1986 – transportation user fee based
 - Gas tax is 17.5 cents per gallon
 - Increasing reliance on bonds and federal funding for any new capacity in mid-1990s
 - Federal highway funds now largest source

VDDT The Context, continued

- In 2004, a multimodal examination of capacity needs found a \$108 billion gap between funding and needs in the next 20 years
- Since 2004, there has been incremental support of additional one-time funding for transportation along with changes to project delivery
 - Transportation Partnership Opportunity Fund
 - Incentives for takeover of local roads by localities
 - General Funds to offset impact of debt service

WDDT History of PPPs

- Late 1980's, private franchise legislation governed like a utility – Dulles Greenway
- 1995 Public Private Transportation Act (PPTA)
 - Unsolicited and solicited procurements with finding of more timely or less costly
 - Proposals focused on using traditional financing to deliver new construction – limited private sector financial risk
 - 2005 revisions to address lessons learned



Current PPTA Law

- Identify timelines and activities within each phase of procurement
- Require greater commitments or guarantees by proposers – mandatory risk sharing
- Increase flexibility in the development of interim agreements to accelerate required activities
- Promote transparency and public involvement



- 53 unsolicited proposals 11 agreements worth \$8.7 billion
- Solicited proposals for two projects:
 - Reconstruction of I-81 (in negotiation and tiered NEPA process)
 - Route 460 from Hampton Roads to I-295 in Richmond region (proposals due in September 2006)
- 8 proposals currently active construction value of more than \$11 billion
 - All new toll facilities







Program Has Changed Dramatically

- Generally, between 1995 and 2002, signed agreements were fundamentally sole source contracts using traditional public funds/debt – no financial risk or investment by private sector
- Federal funding was not used to finance them
- By virtue of the agreement, these projects became the funding priority for the Commonwealth



- Return/not accept unsolicited proposals which didn't include private risk
- Put controls around "lobbying"
- Require ability to use federal funding
- Require project proposals to be a clear transportation priority of the Commonwealth
- Once decision made to develop project using PPP, became partners

Initial Concession Steps

- Worked with legislators and industry to:
 - provide policy direction for use of any lease payment (stay in corridor; transportation purpose)
 - defined transportation facility under long-term lease with concession operator as property indirectly owned by the Commonwealth which provided tax benefits
 - significant toll violation and enforcement legislation with "teeth"



Pocahontas Parkway

- First construction PPTA in Virginia
 - Originally financed using tax-exempt bonds (IRS Rule 63-20) - \$346 million
 - Traffic and revenue projections did not materialize
 - Bonds downgraded; VDOT had loaned \$
- Amended and re-assigned PPTA agreement to Transurban (T895) as a 99-year concession in June 2006 – paid off all outstanding debt/loans
- Approach to risk was "who is in best position to manage?"



Pocahontas Risk Sharing

Risk	assumed by VDOT	assumed by T895
Financing	None	Yes
Traffic and Revenue	None	Yes
O&M and Major Maintenance	Oversight	Yes
Change in Law (discriminatory)	Yes	
Operating Standards	Oversight	Yes
Toll Rate Setting		Based on a toll escalation formula
Environmental	Shared	Shared
Construction of the Richmond Airport Connector	Oversight & Excess of cap	Yes – if TIFIA Ioan
Force Majeure	Shared for uninsurable events (bridge)	Shared
Revenue over an agreed return on total investment	Shared	Shared



Pocahontas Revenue Sharing & Termination

 Revenue Sharing – based on a series of calculations tied to real net cash flow and internal rate of return

- Termination VDOT has the right to terminate for convenience after 40 years at a cost
 - Forty years was the estimated time it would have taken the prior operator to pay off all liabilities



- PPP is not appropriate for every project Commonwealth estimates that 20% of need can be addressed thru P3s
- Engineering is easy part financing and operations critical pieces
- Need private partner who has some risk for "after its built"; need healthy public partner
- Make solid decisions each time they do come back



- Development of expertise takes time have good lawyers and financial advisors – excellent traffic modeling
- Conflicts of interest and political interference
- Significant time commitments by both public and private partners – senior staff
- Set and manage realistic expectations among all parties

VDDT If We Were at Beginning?

- Learn from others
- It is a business decision not a political decision
- Solicit proposals be in control
- Embrace prospect and allow failure
- Set clear policy goals and remember big picture
- Recognize that the agreements in each one will become precedent for next



- With concessions, we are returning to where we started – private operators of transportation infrastructure used by public
- Focusing on expanded capacity rather than greenfield development – systems operations critical
- Traditional methods and funding cannot meet our transportation needs

 PPPs can't save us but they can help us



Virginia's Public-Private Partnership Approach

Barbara W. Reese, Summer/Fall 2006